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ABSTRACT : The question of rationality in front of the diversity of knowledge practices 
 The diversity of knowledge practices that correspond, in different cultural systems, to 
what we call «science» in our own (or owns), asks the question not only of knowing whether these 
sciences or knowledges may be compared and how, but also, more deeply, that of the type of 
rationality which underlines them. We intend to situate some aspects of the latter question from a 
methodological point of view, philosophical as well as historical. We show, in particular, that 
history of science provides in this respect elements, by permitting to recognize, under the 
transformations of the contents of knowledge, correlative transformations of rationality itself that 
make possible to discover, to recognize and to assimilate new knowledges.   
 
RESUME : La question de la rationalité face à la diversité des pratiques de connaissance 
 La diversité des pratiques de connaissance qui correspondent, dans des systèmes 
culturels différents, à ce que nous appelons «science» dans le nôtre (ou les nôtres) pose la question 
non pas seulement de savoir si ces sciences ou connaissances sont comparables et comment, mais 
aussi, plus profondément, celle de la rationalité qui les sous-tend. On se propose de situer quelques 
aspects de cette dernière question d'un point de vue méthodologique, tant philosophique 
qu'historique. On montre, en particulier, que l'histoire des sciences fournit à cet égard des éléments, 
en laissant discerner, sous les transformations des contenus de connaissance, des transformations 
corrélatives de la rationalité qui permettent de découvrir, de reconnaître et d'assimiler les 
connaissances nouvelles. 
 
RESUMEN : La cuestion de la racionalidad frente a la diversidad de las practicas de 
conocimiento. 
 La diversidad de las prácticas de conocimiento que corresponden, en los diferentes 
sistemas culturales, a lo que nosotros llamamos de «ciencia» en el nuestro (ou los nuestros) lleba la 
cuestion no solamente de saber si esas ciencias o conocimientos son comparables y como, pero 
también, más profundamente, la cuestion de la rationalidad que los sobtiende. Queremos, en esa 
comunicación, situar algunos aspectos de esta última interrogación de un ponto de vista 
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metodológico, filosófico así como historico. Mostramos, particularmente, que la história de las 
ciencias fornece elementos a ese respecto, dejandonos dicernir, bajo las transformaciones de los 
contenidos cognitivos, transformaciones correlativas de la rationalidad que permiten descubrir, 
reconocer y asimilar nuevos conocimientos. 
 
CONTENTS.- 1. Knowledge, science, rationality, and cultural systems.- 2. Considering different 
cultures : comparisons, relationships, dialogues.- 3. Considering scientific fields in modern and 
contemporary science. 4. Rationality, on the whole…Bibliographical references. 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION. KNOWLEDGE, SCIENCE, RATIONALITY, AND CULTURAL 
SYSTEMS 
 
 The diversity of the knowledge practices and of the systems of thought 
that correspond, in different cultural systems, to what we call science in our own 
(or our owns), asks the question not only of knowing whether these sciences or 
knowledges may be compared and how, but also, more deeply, that of to which 
type of rationality do they correspond. The problem of rationality has been 
generally considered by philosophy and history of science from the analysis of 
scientific domains defined more or less in the way we conceive them today. In the 
twentieth century, emphasis has been put by philosophy on the criteria that allow 
to state that a given knowledge is rational, and these criteria are practically 
identified with those of scientificity (verificationism for meaning «à la» Carnap, 
faillibilism «à la» Popper, etc.), being admitted, however, that there are different 
criteria for each domain of science, and rationality is not uniform
1
. It is admitted 
also, since Kantian philosophy, that a different type of reason should be invoked 
respectively for knowledge (theoretical or pure reason) and for action (practical 
reason, referred to ethics for Kant, to which other can be added such as technical 
and decisional reasons). Considerations from historical epistemology have shown 
that rational knowledge grows through reorganizations and these latter imply 
modifications of the conceptions of  the rational frame itself
2
.  
 In this sense, Jean Ladrière speaks of the “polymorphism of reason” 
and of its “intrisic historicity”3. Let us note that the idea that reason itself and not 
only the contents of knowledge are evolving has to be brought back to Hegel, i.e. 
to a philosophy that was not directly connected with exact science
4
. But it is in 
science that one generally thinks to be able to identify these evolving forms, 
because science is closer than any other human activity to a direct use of reason, 
and is often accompanied by a reflexive and conscious thought about it. As 
Ladrière says again : “Reason builds itself in the practices in which it recognizes 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, among significant and relatively recent studies that deal explicitly with 
rationality and science : Newton-Smith [1981], Radnitsky and Andersson [1978]. 
2
 Gaston Bachelard has insisted on this, calling history of science upon the task to grasp 
“rationality in the making”, and asking from epistemology to “put systematically reason and 
scientific object into a dialectics of cooperation” (Bachelard [1949], p. 9). And, as he wrote : “The 
intentionality of applied rationalism keeps in reserve the possibility of rectifying itself” (ibid., p. 
10). As for his quoted book, he analyses in it various “regional rationalisms" (or disciplinar ones) 
from the recent history of physics. 
3
 Ladrière [1999]. See also Ladrière [1977]. 
4
 Granger [1955]. 
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itself and it discovers itself in the process of its elaboration. Science plays an 
important paper in this process of self-constitution of reason. From the form of 
rationality it uses essential features of reason are revealed, and by reflecting about 
these one find in them data of a peculiar significance”5.  
 But the fact that science as we know it today is a good analyser for the 
characteristics of rationality does not mean that it exhausts the forms rationality 
can take, and neither that it allows to exhibit clearly all the components of these 
rationalities, for reason itself is implied in its own judgements about reason, in its 
self-understanding, and some opacity will therefore always remain in its own 
grounds
6
 as, indeed, in any search for foundations of knowledge. For this reason 
and because it is an evolving entity, reason is not closed inside itself. It is open to 
some necessity that escapes it, which means that we don't know how to 
characterize reason in a fully analytical (and predictive) way, although we may 
know how it works through its use. Reason is a function of the mind, and capacity 
to it is underlying, in a way or another, thoughts and actions, the conscious ones 
(which does not mean, indeed, that thoughts and actions are not led also by other 
instances such as desires, passions, imagination, the subconscious…), and 
possibly many unconscious ones as well, although indirectly, through a complex 
network whose exact knowledge stands outside of our reach. On another hand, 
reason escapes us in that sense that we do not master its definition nor the 
direction toward which it impulses us with respect to new and future uses of it, 
and to our future conceptions of it as well.  
 For all what precedes, it appears highly wishable not to restrict our 
study of rationality inside the field of modern and present sciences, and to 
consider other conditions of its use and other circumstances of its being 
constituted. We shall however restrict ourselves here to considerations on 
rationality and «positive» knowledge. From this perspective, our conception of 
present science itself will be somewhat enlarged and, when considering cases in it, 
and particularly cases of creative activity, we shall perhaps be more sensitive to a 
diversity in the ways of thinking and reasoning of scientists, than we were before, 
and above all if we have been trained in a context where scientific statements were 
considered as needing “rational reconstructions” after having been invented in 
order to become truely scientific
7
. 
 Rationality can actually be found in any cultural system related to 
knowledge, even when this knowledge looks essentially empirical, and even when 
it is narrowly tighted with other kinds of representations and beliefs. As to the first 
consideration, we may assert that any empirical knowledge is embedded into a 
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 “La raison se construit dans les pratiques en lesquelles elle se reconnaît et elle se découvre elle-
même en se construisant. La science joue un grand rôle dans ce processus d'autoconstitution de la 
raison. Dans la forme de rationalité qu'elle met en œuvre se révèlent des traits essentiels de la 
raison, qui s'imposent à la reflexion comme des données particulièrement significatives” (Ladrière 
[1999]). 
6
 Ladrière states this nicely in his quoted article (Ladrière [1999]). 
7
 This being the «received» view from logical positivism and empiricism, shared after them by 
many philosophers and even historians of science, with the distinction between the contexts of 
“discovery” and of “justification” proposed by Hans Reichenbach (Reichenbach [1938]) and 
widely admitted from Karl Popper (Popper [1935, 1972]) to Imre Lakatos (Lakatos [1978]) and 
Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn [1962, 1977]). 
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system of significations that links it to some rationality. As for the second one, our 
assertion can be argumented by considering (although we shall do it very briefly 
here) various situations of knowledge and the corresponding rationalities in 
different cultural systems of the past or of the present times. We shall begin by 
evoking different and heterogeneous cultures and their respective related forms of 
rationality ; we shall then make our path inside the given particular cultural 
direction that is related with «modern» and «contemporary» science, focusing our 
attention on the question of the constitution of a given scientific field through a 
variety of elaborations and endeavours that can be considered as equally valuable 
from the point of view of rationality.  
 We shall propose, on the whole, that the diversity of and the changes 
in the forms of the rationalities that are actually at work in the scientific enterprise 
must  be considered as a universal factual (historical) circumstance, that 
characterizes human knowledge in general and its conditions of possibility and of 
effectiveness. We might then be able to understand more clearly how rationality is 
the frame required by thought to make the world intelligible ; and to grasp 
something of the means through which it is adapted by the mind to this effect, 
when trying to assimilate the data or the elements that are presented to it or which 
it has been led to discover. The diversity and changes in rationality are directly 
related with the various possible ways to make the world intelligible in given 
intellectual and cultural contexts and to respond to the demand of a better 
intelligibility for it. This by no means entails any relativism in a radical sense, for 
rationality implies the possibility of communication, hence of comparison, and 
changes of rationalities operate through the capacity of these to grow
8
.  
 
 
2. CONSIDERING DIFFERENT CULTURES : COMPARISONS, RELATIONSHIPS, 
DIALOGUES 
 
 All human societies have and have had cultural life, realizations and 
world-views that include knowledge practices and a body of knowledges, taking 
as a whole or separately the form of a system. In the modern world, the knowledge 
system has been conceived as self-consistent and as constituting a clearly 
separable form, called «science», among other components and forms of culture 
such as art, technique, religion, etc. Different cultures have not had necessarily the 
same categorizations and separations, and this must be taken into account when 
we want to compare the different practices and symbolic representations of 
knowledge in other cultures corresponding to parts of our «science». 
 In all these cultures, the systems of representation that include 
knowledge are not closed inside themselves, being necessarily open to the world 
from where they get their knowledge contents (starting from the environment, 
which includes the starred sky), and effectiveley also to other cultural and 
knowledge systems (beginning from those of their immediate neighbours). 
Anthropology, ethnology, history of civilizations, history of science, teach us with 
their various voices that such interactions with the world and such exchanges and 
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transmissions are constant features of the societies among each other, as well as of 
individual human beings with the world and between themselves. Take botanical, 
agronomic and medicinal knowledges that are present in any human traditional 
collectivity and enrooted since the depth of times in secular experience, practices 
and beliefs. Take also the sophisticated geometrical drawings or material figures 
of artwork, pottery, weaving, basketwork, body painting, exhibiting a refined 
knowledge on symmetries, as encountered in many indigenous cultures around the 
world, and which are at present an object of study of ethnomathematics
9
. We may 
evoke as well the complex matrimonial and exogamic relationships in indigenous 
ethnies, that exhibit, according to Claude Lévi-Strauss
10
, structural features of the 
groups considered in mathematics : which reveals a practical ability to implicit 
deep mathematical thinking, even if it remains unconscious to the actors 
themselves, as an expression of the structure of mind confronted with a complex 
of conditions. 
 Among the common features that are responsible for this capacity of 
men in society to observe, to make symbolic representations, to act consciously on 
the world, one is the capacity of reasoning, that is to think, accordingly to what we 
call reason, that is “equal in all human beings”, as Descartes wrote11. And there is 
effectively no doubt that reason is present in all men and in all cultures, for 
without it they would not have survived, produced and developed material and 
cultural realizations such as those as we can witness in the present and also, for 
some of those of the past, partially preserved, which we can observe and try to 
understand, as meaning for us and as meaning (a different one) for them. 
 But the forms of rationality at work in these knowledge practices and 
representations are very different from one culture to another one. Behind the 
diversity of the knowledges, we find a diversity of the forms of rationality, in 
geographical space and above all through history. What do these rationalities have 
in common ? and what does justify us to refer them to a single and common 
property such as reason (that is, the capacity of reasoning) ? 
 To fix the ideas, we can take some illustrative historical examples of 
the diversities of rationalities, which exhibit some fundamental features they have 
in common, referred to sharing a function, as can be shown from considerations 
about comparison, relationship, dialogue and exchange. Such a state of things 
allows us henceforth to speak rightly of them in terms of the same concept of 
«rationality», although it presents itself under different forms. 
 Mythical thought, for example, is not outside the frontiers of reason, 
although it has seldom been explicitly referred to the function of reason and to 
rationality. In his profound study The philosophy of symbolic forms, where he 
analyses successively language, mythical thought and the phenomenology of 
knowledge, Ernst Cassirer considers that “myth and scientific knowledge do not 
differenciate one from the other by the nature and the quality of the categories they 
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 See, for example, Gerdes [2000 a and b]. 
10
 Lévi-Strauss [1948, 1958]. See the analyse of the structural method in Lévi-Strauss, in particular 
from his 1948 book, by Françoise Héritier (Héritier [1999]), and the remarks by Emmanuel Terray 
(Terray [1999]). 
11
 Descartes [1637].  
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use, but by their modality”12. We can actually refer these categories and their 
modalities to features of reasoning. Cassirer exemplifies his assertion by 
mentioning the “modes of connection” used in both forms of thought in order to 
give “the form of the unity” to the diversity of the tangible world, and he observes 
that they are the same for both. He explains this from the fact that they are the 
more general “«forms» of thought and of intuition, constituting the unity of 
consciousness as such, and henceforth the unity of the mythical consciousness as 
well as of the pure scientific consciousness”13. Further on, he emphasizes that, 
“abstractly speaking”, the “same kinds of relationships, of unity and plurality, of 
«coexistence», «proximity» and «succession»” rule the interpretations of the 
world, the mythical as well as the scientific ones.  
 Cassirer situates the difference, at this categorial level, between 
mythical and scientific thoughts, in the specific role played, in scientific thought, 
by the “synthetic judgement”, which operates a unification, in the intuition, of the 
diverse through the relationship of the latter's elements, idealized, and thought as 
such, from their mutual relations, made explicit and formalized. On the contrary, 
unity and totality, which are most pregnant in mythical thought, are obtained in it 
through a mere identification of all the elements toward the whole in which they 
melt. The wholeness of scientific thought is conceptual and abstract (it is such that 
“idealized relations build formally the world according to universal laws”), 
whereas that of mythical thought is concrete and immediately given, and 
imaginary at the same time. In Cassirer's analysis, mythical thought in its various 
states admits only one dimension and one level of being for its relationships ; the 
part becomes (or is) the whole (instead of representing it), and the substantial 
relationship (of coïncidence and identification) is thought according to a law of 
participation (a concept put forward by Lévy-Bruhl
14
). But in its upper versions, 
mythical thought has been at the origin of scientific thought, explains Cassirer, 
taking as examples astrology and alchemy as two forms of “the mythical thought 
of substantial identity” (bringing together different effects that they relate to a 
unique material cause)
15
. 
 We may wonder whether it is possible to go deeper into the 
exploration of reason inside components of systems of thought that are generally 
taken as mythical, but which in some way or other are related to the production of 
positive knowledge, and which could henceforth be compared with explicitely 
assumed rationality and possibly converge with it. Let us take shamanic societies 
as one possible type of examples, considered either far away in time with 
prehistorical societies, either in contemporary remote contexts
16
. According to the 
present ethnographic conceptions, shamanism is an objective, anthropological and 
social, phenomenon that includes a system of representations, of ideas and values, 
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 Cassirer [1923-1929], vol. 2, trad. fr., p. 85. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Lévy-Bruhl [1922]. 
15
 Cassirer [1923-1929], vol. 2, trad. fr., p. 91-92. See also, in this book, the subsequent analyse of 
myth as a form of intuition, and as a form of life, seen as primary directions for the formation of 
future scientific thought.  
16
 For the prehistorical societies supposedly shamanic, see Clottes, Lewis-Williams [1996]. For 
shamanic societies of the nowadays, see, for instance, the review by Xavier Ricard (Ricard 
[2000]). 
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of symbols and concepts, a body of knowledge about nature with applications, 
cures of diseases, etc. It involves also an animist thought about nature, which is at 
the same time irrational and rationally structured.  
 According to the definition proposed by Roberte Hayamon, 
shamanism is “a symbolic system founded on a dualistic conception of the world 
[with] relationships of alliance and exchange with the supra-natural beings that are 
supposed to govern the natural beings from whom his subsitence depends (…), 
[with] nature he treats as a partner, which requires from him a personalized art ; 
this function, a regular one, affords him with a central position and founds the 
totalizer aspect of shamanism in societies which are, for this reason, called 
shamanist”17. In all these respects, shamanism appears as a religious system 
among others, in which the knowledge of nature (and of man) is intrisically related 
with a rational activity, even if it calls also for beliefs in supernatural entities. 
 In such systems, modifications of knowledge and, possibily, to some 
degree, of its structure, are observed, through exchanges operated from shamans 
circulation among themselves from a village to another one, and through the 
necessity in which shamanic societies are to adapt themselves to the modifications 
of their environment. In these adaptations, rational reflection of the kind we 
consider as being such (involving relationships of elements through the 
consideration of their differences) seems to take an important part, witnessing a 
general aspect of the function of rationality, which is conscious adaptation to 
external changes
18
.  
 To explore more thoroughly these questions is the project of a young 
anthropologue, Xavier Ricard, who is presently studying shamanic societies in the 
altiplano of the Andes mountains of southern Peru, a region where Alfred Métraux 
did his own research more than half a century ago, but still poorly known
19
. He 
wants to examine to which extent shamanism is a consistenty body of practices 
and representations, and corresponds to elaborations and transformations with a 
rational frame. His inquiry takes as a starting point the following question, a 
pertinent one about any apparently irrational representation of the world upon 
which a given society founds itself : “How can beliefs which appear as irrational 
serve as long lasting foundations to a society ? (…) How can such beliefs go on in 
time, and be convincing enough to organize, on a wide scale, social relations ?”, 
considering the established social importance of the shaman.  
 According to Xavier Ricard's approach, shamanism is a mode of 
religious thinking, and has links with reason which must be studied in a similar 
way as religious thinkings and traditions have been studied in the West, not 
restraining oneself to mere sociological or anthropological descriptions ; but 
considering questions of meaning, which deal with the rationality beneath this 
phenomenon, considered in its objective manifestations as well as in its meaning 
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 “Un système symbolique fondé sur une conception dualiste du monde (avec) des relations 
d'alliance et d'échange avec les êtres surnaturels censés gouverner les êtres naturels dont dépend sa 
subsistance (…), (avec) la nature qu'il traite en partenaire, ce qui réclame de sa part un art 
personnalisé ; cette fonction, régulière, lui confère une place centrale et fonde le caractère 
totalisateur du chamanisme dans les sociétés dites, pour cette raison, chamanistes” (Hayamon 
[1990]. See also Perrin [1995].  
18
 Ricard [2000].  
19
 The native languages spoken in this altiplano are quichua and aymara. 
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contents. Such a kind of research would be epistemological at the same time it is 
ethnological, and would be able to give original insights about the “universality of 
rationality”, which is at the roots of the unity of human kind. An idea of the universality of rationality as a critical function of representations and rules of action underlies such an inquiry, although this rationality is to be identified under forms that differ from those we are used to. In the present situation, 
shamanism is no more isolated, as relations exist between different shamanic 
societies, between shamans of various places, of them with the urban society, with 
christanism and african religions (giving rise to syncretisms), even with 
ethnological approaches through the mediation of conscious informers. 
Shamanism in this region shows a progressive acculturation, through 
modifications and adaptations, the modalities of which may reveal the role played 
by rational reflexivity from the shamans as well as from their interlocutors. Such 
moving circumstances may be favorable to catch rationality at work in the 
modification of representations
20
. 
 A dialogue, about such questions, between the anthropologist and the 
epistemologist would be highly welcome, because it would possibly lead to new 
results and perspective, on shamanism and its «reasons», object of these inquiries, 
but also in contributing to widen the apprehension of human faculty of reasoning 
in its most diverse modalities. Rationality manifests itself under a variety of 
forms, depending on the cultures, on the representations and knowledge systems, 
and also on the diversity of the objects of knowledge. Some unity is present inside 
these various forms, which makes communication possible between them : 
similarly, history of ideas, of philosophy and of science have been effective in our 
understanding of the connections existing between religious representations and 
scientific knowledges. 
 Another example would be that of the parallel or convergent 
developments of objective (or positive) knowledges in different cultures taken at a 
given time in history and that are directly subject to comparison from our point of 
view of «downtime». I do not resist, at this point, to evoke what I have learned at 
one of the sessions of this Mexico XXI th International Congress of History of 
Science (the one entitled « Ciencia y tecnología en el México antiguo »), from the 
(rather fascinating) communication of professor Jésus Galíndo Trejo, about a 
possible ancient observation of an exceptional astronomical event by Teotihuacan 
astronomers at the beginning of the present era : an event dated from the Maya 
calendar, and registered in petroglyphs adequately disposed and pictured
21
. These 
petroglyphs represent concentric circles with two perpendicular diameters, rather 
frequent in all Mesoamerica, but concentrated with a rare intensity in a 
Teothihuacan town named Xihuingo.  
 According to Galíndo Trejo's analysis, it is possible to connect two by 
two the centers of such marking stones obtaining the directions of astronomical, 
solar or planetary, events ; among these pairs of glyphs, one emerges as 
exceptional, by the larger number of concentric circles, the related engraves with 
the drawing of a five-harmed star, a symbolic indication for an unusual brillance, 
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 Xavier Ricard, « Shamanic practices and shamanic representations in Southern Peruvian Andes. 
Research project », manuscript, dec. 2000, and private communications. I acknowledge enriching 
conversations I had with Xavier Ricard on occasion of his rare passages by Paris.  
21
 The Teotihuacan culture, akin to Maya's one, was flourishing  with an apogee from 200 to 600 
AD, and have erected the famous pyramids of the Sun and the Moon (close to what would be the 
Aztecs capital, Tenochtitlan, now Mexico City). 
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and a date in Maya's notation ; the direction taken from the centers points toward a 
region of the sky higher than that of regular planetary events. Considering these 
data, Galíndo Trejo suggests that the event registered was well probably a 
supernova ; and it happens that a supernova in this direction, situated in the 
Scorpion constellation, had been effectively registered by Chinese astronomers in 
their catalogues for the year 393 AD, that corresponds to the date written down in 
the mexican petroglyph
22
. If the proposed analysis of the data is correct, and the 
fact thus confirmed, we would have a simultaneous observation and registration in 
two very different and, as far as we know, unconnected cultures, of the 
observation of a supernova in antiquity.  
 I am not able to judge whether the claim is fully fundamented or too 
much hypothetic, but, as Italians say, «si non é vero, bene trovatto». For it is at 
least plausible, considering the degree of advancement of Mesoamerican 
civilizations in astronomy at that period (they had observatories, a refined 
calendar, and there are reports that they even organized once, according to 
registers carved in stones, a meeting of astronomers coming from different regions 
and ethnies of Mesoamerica to unify their calendars
23
). And considering also that 
ancient Mesoamerican astronomers had probably no reason, similarly to Chinese 
ones, to be prevented from paying attention to the apparition in the sky of a new 
and very brilliant star staying there for several months. Their European 
contemporaries, on the contrary, where inhibited against such obervations by their 
conception, inherited from Aristotle philosophy and Ptolemeous astronomy, of 
unalterable heavens.  
 Despite our poor effective knowledge of precolombian astronomy, for 
lack of data, due to the destruction of many precious old manuscripts by the 
conquerers and their Inquisition, it is tempting to think of possible comparisons 
between the astronomies developped by the ancient peoples of, respectively, 
Middle East and Europe, China and America. Their naked-eye observatories and 
the observations collected of celestial events, their calendars, their calculations 
and predictions show, for those which we know, a strong common interest and a 
like ability to ascertain with precision astronomical facts : which, indeed, is to be 
referred to rationality, a widely shared rationality. But this «positive» or 
«objective» rationality, which is that one filtered by our conception of scientific 
thought, is, in the various cultures, differently but intrisically linked with and, 
actually, embedded in, other kinds of mental attitudes and beliefs (religious, 
astrological ones, etc.) and practices (technical practices, as for agriculture, and 
cultural habits, such as State bureaucracy in ancient China, ritual human sacrifices 
in the pre-colombian Mexican world, etc.). Such beliefs, habits and practices seem 
to have been present in all the primary and ancient stages of astronomy and they 
are, stricly speaking, inseparable from the corresponding «positive» rationalities, 
and they affect them in some way or other. And observation itself, that would 
seem to be a common faculty that transcends cultural differences (this faculty 
being ultimately referred to rationality), is also affected (remind the perfect 
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 Galíndo Trejo [2001], and oral exposition at the Congress. 
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 On Mayas achievements on astronomy and calendar (which developed fully between 200 and 
900 BC), see Thompson [1958] ; and on Maya influence on other american indian cultures, see 
Radin [1935], chap. 2. These are my readings, clearly not up-to date. 
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celestial sphere of the Greeks just evoked) by the theoretical, metaphysical or 
religious conceptions and beliefs, and therefore displays also differences.  
 Other types of cases to be fruitfully considered for our inquiry about 
the forms of rationality are those of men of science from different cultural 
horizons who come into processes of interaction, exchange, and even dialogue, 
witnessing convergent intellectual and rational grounds of their thoughts, despite 
the cultural differences. Of such a kind was the encounter of European Jesuits 
with Chinese mathematicians in 17 th century : from both sides there recognized 
that they were speaking of the same field of knowledge (altough a very abstract 
one, such as mathematics)
24
. Such also, and even more striking, were the 
reciprocal travels of the French astronomer Le Gentil in India between 1761 and 
1770, and of the Indian noble Mirza Abu Talib Khan in France and Europe 
between 1799 and 1803, as reported by Dr Irfan Habib in another session of this 
Congress (that on « Changes in interpretation and conceptual contents »)
25
. In 
these we acknowledge also an intellectual feature that favours the recognition of 
common grounds for rationality : the mind-openness of both travellers, and their 
desire to know what the other culture had that was missing in their own. In other 
words, they consciously and wellwillingly prepared their minds to enlarge their 
abilitiy to know and to understand, through widenings of their own rationalities, 
by meeting and confronting with the other. 
 
 
3. CONSIDERING SCIENTIFIC FIELDS IN MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE 
 
 Then we come to other kinds of cases, dealing this time with scientific 
fields in modern and contemporary science. Let us first mention the diversity of 
the «episteme» of each of the various sciences as they have been elaborated. Each 
of these «episteme», characteristic of a specific domain of knowledge or scientific 
discipline, delimits the ways of reasoning and of acting inside the field 
considered : mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, astronomy, social 
sciences… Despite the different and specific characters related to the 
corresponding objects, fields, methods, etc., these scientific domains have in 
common a number of general and alike features of their own rationalities, and this 
link is strong enough to allow us referring to them as science in general.  
 Consider also the constitution of scientific disciplines at the time when 
knowledge practices and contents began to be separated into proto-sciences on 
one side and science on the other. This happened by the imposition of scientific 
requirements corresponding to a set of norms outside of which any propositions 
on knowledge were not considered anymore as science but either as error either as 
pseudo-science.  
 A strong example is the progressive constitution of modern physics 
that started in XVIII th century (theoretical and mathematical, as well as 
experimental physics). The middle of that century was the marking moment when 
this scientificity requirement was formulated in a definite way, on occasion of the 
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process of mathematization of physics, and of the setting up of precise 
observational or experimental rules to be confronted with the theoretical 
statements. The mathematization of physics began with mechanics, the science of 
the motions of bodies in space and through time, these being continuous quantities 
with a mathematical expression. The study of motion, from local and 
instantaneous changes up to global trajectories and laws, entailed the need, further 
than the usual geometry, of differential and integral calculus, the use of which 
required a considerable training and professionalization.  
 Euler, Clairaut and d'Alembert defined, in the line of newtonian 
physics, a new physico-mathematical «analytical» style for physics, in the domain 
of mechanics of solids and fluids, and of astronomy. By doing so, they determined 
a «no return» motion that, from then on, at least in this domain, excluded as an 
effect outside of science all other approaches, purely qualitative and often 
fancyful
26
. They were at the same time fixing implicitly the conditions that would 
have to be filled in order to open and elaborate new scientific fields for physics, 
which occurred in the next century, with optics, electromagnetism, 
thermodynamics and chemistry. These conditions correspond to a new turn for 
scientific rationality, where the physical concepts and magnitudes had to be 
conceived through their mathematical expression, and their mutual relationships 
were to be ruled by physical principles adequately choosen (enunciating 
generalized founding physical properties). 
 Our last kind of cases will be that, today quite commonplace, of 
changes occurring or manifesting their necessity inside a given established field of 
scientific knowledge. The need for such changes comes from experimental or 
theoretical considerations of a definite and precise nature. The change in 
knowledge, be it already realized or be only its necessity ineluctably announced 
from some unsuperable inconsistency at the present state, reveals the presence 
hereafter of elements of knowledge that were absent previously. It is some 
«novelty» that manifests itself in such situations, that is to tell something 
previously unknown and even unsuspected that is in the process of being known. 
«Novelty» is often incorporated into knowledge, in the beginnings, in negative or 
blue-print, and it demands, for being fully assimilated and recognized, for being 
known, to be made intelligible. «Novelty», for this, not seldom requires 
reorganizations of the existing knowledge, which implies most often modifications 
of rationality itself. Let us quote two examples of such processes. 
 Let us consider first the newtonian concept of (instantaneous) 
gravitational attraction at a distance, which imposed itself in order to give account 
of the laws governing the solar and planetary system, although it was not 
explainable in terms of any previously known physical knowledge (of the type of 
mechanical actions of contact). It is adequate here to refer to d'Alembert's 
epistemological analysis of the concept of attraction, elaborated some sixty years 
after Newton's Principia and published in Diderot's and d'Alembert's 
Encyclopédie
27
. This analysis can be summarized as the recognition of a rational 
necessity, although not reducible in known terms, and as a transformation of this 
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 D'Alembert, entry « Attraction », in d'Alembert and Diderot [1751-1780], vol. 1. See Paty [2001 
a, d]. 
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«empirically originated» concept, into a rational principle of explanation for the 
motion of celestial bodies. So to speak, the rational explanation was not to be 
looked for in the past knowledge, but it was let to be found in a proximate future 
knowledge, which would emerge from the theoretical construction in which it was 
presently incorporated. Its mathematical form (the inverse square of distances) 
offered itself as a tool permitting to obtain the adequate theoretical relationships 
between the dynamical quantities that would prove adequate (in the case through 
calculations of the three-body problem for the Sun and planets). This new view, as 
explicited by d'Alembert, allowed to understand the concept of attraction-at-a-
distance that was previously unthinkable through its dynamical function in the 
theory of mechanical astronomy. We can rightly call this process of making 
intelligible the whole system of attraction-mechanics-astronomy a modification (in 
the circumstance, an extension) of the physico-theoretical rationality. 
 The second example is more recent, as it deals with the question of the 
interpretation of quantum theory. This theory, aimed initially at phenomena that 
escape direct perception like atoms, radiation and elementary particles of matter, 
makes use of abstract concepts, got from the hamiltonian formalization of 
mechanics and classical physics, such as that of «state function» (defined in 
mathematical Hilbert space, and submitted to the «principle of linear 
superposition») and «dynamical variables operators» (also mathematically 
defined) acting on these state functions. These concepts or quantities give account, 
through the application of the mathematical formalism, of the specific behavior of 
quantum phenomena and systems. But their physical meaning has been considered 
questionable, as these theoretical entities do not correspond directly with the more 
common ones that are measured through the man-sized experimental devices and 
are of a classical type.  
 The theoretical (mathematical) quantities of the «formalism» are put in 
correspondence with the observed experimental results in an indirect way, by 
adding to their mathematical form an «interpretation» (in mixed physical and 
philosophical terms, the so-called «orthodox» interpretation, or Bohr's 
«complementarity conception»). By itself, this way of making quantum 
phenomena intellligible represented already a change in the usual way of 
rationalizing physics, and can be considered as a change of rationality : a strong 
change indeed, maybe a too strong one, because it modified drastically not only 
the theoretical conceptions of physics, but nearly all the underlying meta-
theoretical conceptions, including general philosophy of knowledge itself (about 
reality, observation, understanding…).  
 Other ways of getting intelligibility of the quantum domain can be 
looked for, that would be less costly on the whole for our general conception of 
knowledge and for our theoretical understanding. For example, we could choose 
an interpretation of quantum theory that would give privilege to the follwing 
consideration : physics prefers, if we dare say, to find the meaning of its 
statements inside its own theoretical system, avoiding, insofar as it is possible, to 
borrow external intelligibility statements. It happens that to do so is possible by 
simply admitting that the theoretical, mathematical, abstract quantities of the 
«formalism» can be consitently considered as having a direct physical meaning, 
that of representing theoretically the quantum system considered. As a matter of 
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fact, all specific quantum properties are given from these (in particular the ones 
exhibited recently for individual quantum systems :interference, entanglement or 
local non-separability, etc…), and they are therefore, more than any other ones, 
physically significant. One would then be in right to afford a direct physical 
meaning to state vectors and operators as representing directly quantum systems, 
for they bear the relationship properties, which is characteristic of magnitudes or 
quantities in general
28
.  
 This new understanding would suppose to enlarge the usually admitted 
definition of a physical quantity, restricted generally to numerical variables and 
functions, by allowing it to embrace as well the more complex mathematical 
forms of the quantum theoretical quantities.  Such an extension of the meaning of 
what a physical quantity is considerably simplifies the problems of interpretation, 
as I have argumented elsewhere
29
. Clearly, it corresponds to a modification of 
rationality when considered for quantum physics, and actually to an extension of 
rationality, as it provides a larger basis for understanding both quantum and 
classical physics and their relationships (the passage from the one to the other 
domains). Here again, changes (as it is, widenings) of rationality makes possible a 
fuller and deeper intelligibility.  
 
 
4. RATIONALITY, ON THE WHOLE… 
 
 From these considerations let us draw, provisionally, in a few 
commented sentences, some unformal elements of conclusion, that appear actually 
related to the interest, for further investigations, of considering a «history of 
rationality», of the diversity of its forms and the universality of its function, of its 
changes, its confrontations and, as it seems, its widenings and growth. 
 Rationality makes communication possible. What we have called 
«different rationalities» have in common their efficiency in symbolic 
representations, their function of intelligibilty, and their ability to favour 
communication, inside a given group or culture (for a given rationality), as well as 
from one system of rationality to another one. In the last case, communication 
might be somewhat difficult in particular situations, but one can, at least, think of 
and learn how to come to such a communication : many endeavours and 
experiences, along the history of societies and cultures, witness that it is possible 
and has been effective.  
 Assimilating the empirical. In order to enlarge and deepen the access 
to the empirical world one needs transformations and widenings of rationality, as 
many examples of the use of mathematics in physics have attested, especially 
since XVIII th century. 
 Intelligibility depends on rationality. The empirical let itself be read 
and assimilated according to a rational scheme in order to become intelligible. In 
other words, intelligibility is not unique but depends of the type of rationality 
associated with it. 
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 Comparing rationalities. What makes a hierarchy of the rationalities 
for a given field of knowledge is their respective capacities to be open to the 
necessity of changes, in particular through communication. 
 Rationality is doomed to grow. Rationality in knowledge processes, as 
well as in other domains of human thought and activities, is doomed to change, 
and in particular, concerning science, to extend. Reason is a human, mental, 
capacity that can grow without ceasing to be reason, and by continuing to be an 
homogeneous function of the mind. It nutrishes itself from the empirical world, as 
well as from scientific practice, and from exchanges and assimilations of other 
elements of rationality of a different kind, merging them into a more 
comprehensive rationality.  
 
(México-Tenochtitlán, july 14
th
, 2001.) 
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